The Effect of School District Consolidation on Student Achievement: Evidence from Arkansas by McGee, Josh B et al.
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
ScholarWorks@UARK 
Education Reform Faculty and Graduate 
Students Publications Education Reform 
1-26-2021 
The Effect of School District Consolidation on Student 
Achievement: Evidence from Arkansas 
Josh B. McGee 
University of Arkansas, jbm04@uark.edu 
Jonathan N. Mills 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Jessica S. Goldstein 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/edrepub 
 Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational Leadership 
Commons, and the Other Educational Administration and Supervision Commons 
Citation 
McGee, J. B., Mills, J. N., & Goldstein, J. S. (2021). The Effect of School District Consolidation on Student 
Achievement: Evidence from Arkansas. Education Reform Faculty and Graduate Students Publications. 
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/edrepub/119 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Education Reform at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Education Reform Faculty and Graduate Students Publications by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu. 
The Effect of School District Consolidation on Student Achievement: 
Evidence from Arkansas* 
 
Josh B. McGee† 
University of Arkansas  
 
Jonathan N. Mills 
University of Arkansas 
 
Jessica S. Goldstein 
University of Arkansas 
 





School district consolidation is one of the most widespread education reforms of the last 
century, but surprisingly little research has directly investigated its effectiveness. To examine the 
impact of consolidation on student achievement, this study takes advantage of a policy that requires 
the consolidation of all Arkansas school districts with enrollment of fewer than 350 students for 
two consecutive school years. Using a regression discontinuity model, we find that consolidation 
has either null or small positive impacts on student achievement in math and English Language 
Arts (ELA). We do not find evidence that consolidation in Arkansas results in positive economies 
of scale, either by reducing overall cost or allowing for a greater share of resources to be spent in 
the classroom. 
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District consolidation has been one of the most prevalent education reforms over the last 
century. As a result of consolidation efforts, the number of public school districts in the U.S. 
declined from 117,108 to 13,551 between 1940 and 2018.1 Despite the scale of this reform effort, 
relatively little rigorous research explores the effect of district and school consolidation on student 
achievement. For example, a 2002 literature review by Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger shows 
most prior research focuses on the financial costs and benefits of consolidation, rather than student 
achievement. The studies included in this review find some evidence that district consolidation 
results in positive economies of scale. 
While much of the early research exploits existing variation on school or district enrollment 
to estimate the effects of district size, several recent papers have looked more specifically at 
consolidation as an intervention. Here too, many authors have chosen to focus on outcomes other 
than achievement such as costs, housing prices, and teacher reactions (see Hu & Yinger, 2008; 
Duncombe & Yinger, 2007; and Nitta, Holley, & Wrobel, 2010). The few papers that investigate 
the impact of consolidation on student achievement have found mixed results regarding the 
direction, magnitude, and longevity of effects (see Liu et. al., 2010; Engberg et. al., 2012; Cooley 
& Floyd, 2013; Brummet, 2014; Humlum & Smith, 2015; de Hann, Lueven, & Oosterbeek, 2016; 
and Beuchert, et. al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, the majority of these studies, both those examining existing variation in 
district and school size as well as those examining consolidation-induced changes in size, are 
susceptible to endogeneity issues. Existing variation in district and school enrollment is not 
randomly assigned. For example, some districts and schools are larger or smaller as a function of 
 
1 Table 214.10 in NCES's 2019 Digest of Education Statistics 




their academic quality, a correlation implying biased estimation of the impacts of scale on 
achievement. In addition, districts and schools are rarely selected at random for consolidation. In 
such cases, unobserved characteristics associated with their academic quality are likely to be 
associated with the probability that a district or school is consolidated. 
This paper leverages a natural experiment to understand the effects of consolidation on 
student achievement. Arkansas Act 60, passed in 2004, requires the consolidation of all districts 
with enrollment of less than 350 students for two consecutive years. We leverage the exogenous 
variation created by this policy change and the policy’s clear enrollment threshold to learn about 
the effects of consolidation on student outcomes and district finances. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some of the history 
and important details about Arkansas Act 60, which implemented mandatory district consolidation. 
Section 3 outlines the data used in this study. Section 4 describes our empirical method and Section 
5 provides our results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Arkansas Act 60 
The latest wave of school consolidation in Arkansas arose in response to school finance 
litigation that occurred throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The decade-long litigation 
culminated in 2003 with the Arkansas Supreme Court ruling that the state’s school funding system 
was unconstitutional in Lake View School District vs. Huckabee.2  
Governor Mike Huckabee responded to the court’s decision by convening the State 
Legislature in the Second Extraordinary Session of 2003. Governor Huckabee proposed large-
scale school district consolidation to reduce district administrative costs and provide greater 
educational opportunity for students. Governor Huckabee's original proposal would have resulted 
 
2 https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/lake-view-school-district-no-25-v-huckabee-4167/  




in three-fold reduction in the number of school districts in Arkansas. Compromise legislation was 
passed in early 2004. The Public Education Reorganization Act, Arkansas Act 60, required the 
consolidation of any district with average daily attendance of fewer than 350 students for two 
consecutive school years.3  
The final enrollment threshold of 350 students, while not as drastic as the Governor’s 
original proposal, did result in a substantial number of district consolidations in the years that 
followed. Table 1 presents the number of district consolidations occurring each year beginning 
with the 2004-05 school year. In the first year the law was in effect, 59 school districts were 
required to consolidate. Although Act 60 continues to have an impact as enrollments decline in 
rural districts, only a few districts have been required to consolidate since the initial wave in 2005.  
[Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows the geographic location and district borders of the 99 districts that were 
either a consolidated or receiving district in the 2004-05 school year. The map depicts district 
borders in the year prior to consolidation and districts are color-coded to indicate which districts 
combined due to Act 60. The initial round of consolidations was relatively widespread across the 
state, affecting districts in every region. Districts subject to Act 60 enjoy some autonomy in 
determining which other district to merge with; however, the overwhelming majority have merged 
with adjoining district. 
[Figure 1 here] 
While Act 60 does not specifically require school closure following a consolidation, 
closures often occur to eliminate redundant course offerings and take advantage of potential 
economies of scale. Table 2 presents the number of school closures that occurred following a 
 
3 For the remainder of this paper, when we refer to Act 60 or an enrollment level of 350, we are specifically referring 
to a district’s enrollment in the two years prior to the enactment Act 60. 




district consolidation. Unsurprisingly, consolidation has had a non-trivial impact on school 
closures. In total there 105 school closures occurred between 2005 and 2011. 
[Table 2 here] 
3. Data 
Our analysis uses a rich panel of demographic and performance data for all students who 
took the Arkansas mathematics and English Language Arts (ELA) Benchmark exams between the 
2001-04 and 2007-08 school years. We also have data on district and school enrollment collected 
from the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) as well as information on district consolidation 
and school closure compiled with the help of ADE and district officials. We merge these data to 
create a master panel that includes roughly 200,000 records per year across grades three through 
eight, with multiple records for students across school years. 
While consolidation occurs at the district level, our analysis is conducted using student-
level data. We identify students as effected by consolidation if they were in a district that was 
forced to consolidate due to Act 60 in the 2004-05 school year, the first year the law was in effect, 
and continue to identify them as such for the remainder of their appearance in the data.  
Arkansas did not begin testing third grade students until the 2004-05 school year. Since 
our empirical model, described in the section below, controls for previous year’s test score, 
students in the fourth grade in 2003-04 are the youngest cohort in our analysis. Our study sample 
includes data from the 2003-04 school year through the 2007-08 school year, allowing us to follow 
all consolidation affected students through their last year of testing (i.e., 8th grade).4 
 
4 Ending our study sample in 2007-08 drops a small number observations for students who appear in the data in 
subsequent years for various unknown reasons (e.g., grade repeaters). However, including these observations does 
not affect our results. 




4. Empirical Model 
Endogeneity concerns prevent us from directly examining the effects of consolidation on 
student outcomes. In most cases, district consolidation occurs through selection - districts 
voluntarily choose to consolidate for any number of reasons such as perceived cost benefits or to 
take advantage of state financial incentives. Unfortunately, the very nature of this selection makes 
it likely that results in simple models comparing consolidated districts to unaffected districts will 
be biased. For example, if a poor performing district consolidates with a larger, higher performing 
district to take advantage of fiscal incentives, one might expect a decline in the overall average 
performance in the resulting district. This decline will be reflected in the estimated coefficients 
from a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model but cannot be attribute to the causal effects of 
the consolidation itself. Fortunately, the natural experiment created by Act 60 allows us to use a 
regression discontinuity (RD) model to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
Estimating the achievement impacts of consolidation via regression discontinuity design 
 
We examine the impacts of consolidation on student performance using a standard RD 
approach.5 The explicit enrollment cut-off designated by Act 60 allows us to employ a sharp RD 
model whereby students in districts with enrollment of less than 350 in the two years immediately 
prior to the passage of Act 60 are assigned to the treatment group and students in the remaining 
districts represent the control group. If districts were able to game the forcing variable by either 
purposely avoiding or making themselves subject to the consolidation mandate, then it would 
undermine the sharp RD design. By limiting our analysis to consolidations that occurred in 2005, 
we eliminate the possibility of gaming because these consolidations were determined shortly after 
 
5 For a more general treatment of regression discontinuity models, see Imbens, G.W. & Lemieux, T. (2008). 
Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice. Journal of Econometrics, 142. 




the law passed in 2004 and were based on 2002 and 2003 enrollment data, which districts had no 
ability to alter. 
 Figure 2 shows district assignment to treatment (i.e., consolidation) based on enrollment in 
the 2001-02 and 2002-03 school years. Three types of districts are represented in Figure 2: red 
circles represent districts forced to consolidate by Act 60 (“sending” districts); blue dots represent 
larger districts that merged with the consolidated districts (“receiving” districts); and black circles 
represent districts that were not affected by Act 60 consolidations. Districts in the lower left 
quadrant were below the Act 60 enrollment cutoff in both 2002 and 2003, and all of the red circles 
are in this quadrant. The clear division between the red circles and the other two types of districts 
in Figure 2 illustrates our ability to implement a sharp RD design. 
[Figure 2 here] 
We estimate the achievement impacts of consolidation via RD using the following model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑬𝜽 + 𝑿𝜸 + 𝜌 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
In this equation, Y represents student i's standardized scale score on a state exam, C is an indicator 
variable for district consolidation due to Act 60, X is a vector of individual level controls (ethnicity, 
gender, etc.), ρ contains a set of grade and year indicators, and ε is random error. E is the “forcing” 
or “assignment” variable that determines whether or not one is subject to the treatment (Imbens & 
Lemieux, 2008; Reardon & Robinson, 2012). In our model, E is Euclidean distance based on 
student i's district enrollment in the two years prior to the passage of Act 60 (i.e., 2001-02 and 
2002-03) where the zero point is defined as enrollment of 350 in both years.6 In order to fully 
capture any potential curvature in the relationship between district enrollment and achievement, E 
 
6 Specifically, 𝐸 = √(𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙02 − 350)2 + (𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙03 − 350)2. See Reardon and Robinson (2012) for more 
information on this method. 
 




includes both linear and quadratic terms. β2 represents our estimate of the effect of consolidation 
on student achievement. We estimate this model using a multilevel analysis in which students are 
nested within districts. 
A key component of RD models is defining the local neighborhood around the cut-off 
within which we can reasonably assume local randomization. We face an important trade-off when 
setting the enrollment band that will define our sample: the wider the chosen band, the less 
appropriate the control group; the smaller the band, the less generalizable the results. We employ 
two mechanical bandwidth selection procedures to help inform our decision. 7 Based on the results, 
our preferred bandwidth is a distance of ± 380. Figure 3 presents the distribution of districts by 
values of the forcing variable, E. The mechanical bandwidth selection recommendation of 380 
includes most of the districts affected by Act 60 in 2005. As a robustness check, we also provide 
results for distances of ± 60 and ± 120. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Study sample 
 
Using an RD procedure requires that we assume the exogenous Act 60 enrollment cut-off 
approximates random assignment of districts to the consolidation treatment in the immediate 
neighborhood of the cut-off. If this assumption is accurate, districts just above the Act 60 
enrollment cut-off should be essentially the same as the consolidated districts just below the cutoff. 
We test this hypothesis, presenting averages for several key demographic variables for students in 
both the treatment and control groups for the ± 60 and ± 380 bandwidths in Table 3. The table also 
provides differences and the standard errors for those differences. 
 
7 We performed mechanical bandwidth selection calculations based on Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b) 
and Ludwig and Miller (2007). Calculation results available upon request. 




[Table 3 here] 
White students represent the majority in both samples and bandwidths, but for the smaller 
bandwidth, the treatment group has significantly fewer minority students compared to the control 
group. Both the treatment and control groups are relatively similar on the remaining variables for 
the ± 60 bandwidth. For the larger, preferred bandwidth, the treatment group has significantly 
fewer Hispanic students relative to the control group, and notably, has significantly lower ELA 
performance than the control group as well.  
Even if our particular RD approximates random assignment at the level of school districts, 
it may not necessarily do so at the student level. Each district has a particular demographic profile 
and those just above and below the consolidation threshold may differ in important ways. While 
the differences between treatment and control group documented in Table 3 suggest caution in 
interpreting the RD results, they are not large enough to undermine the entire analysis. 
5. Results 
Achievement impacts 
First, we investigate if there is graphical evidence of a discontinuity in student achievement 
around the enrollment threshold one year after consolidation was implemented. Figure 3 displays 
both linear and quadratic fits of 2005 district-level Math and ELA achievement by our forcing 
variable. We generated similar plots for 2004-05 achievement gains that were quite similar to these 
plots (see Appendix Figure A1). While Figure 4 shows some evidence of a slight positive 
discontinuity at the enrollment threshold for both subjects, the difference in all cases appears 
relatively modest (i.e., less than 0.2 standard deviations). 
[Figure 4 here] 




To investigate the magnitude of these discontinuities, we use a multilevel mixed-effects 
model which allows students to be nested within districts. Table 4 presents estimates of the average 
impact of consolidation on student mathematics and ELA achievement, respectively. Coefficient 
estimates are presented with standard errors in parentheses. For each bandwidth, we include three 
separate models: 1) a simple model that only includes a consolidation indicator and linear version 
of the forcing variable, E, 2) a more complex model that adds lagged achievement and student 
level controls, and 3) a preferred specification which also adds the quadratic form of the forcing 
variable. Each of the regressions presented in Table 4 include grade and year fixed effects to 
control for systematic differences in student performance across these domains.8 Table 4 includes 
students attending receiving districts (those that merged with Act 60 consolidated districts). As a 
robustness check, we estimated models that exclude students from receiving districts and find 
substantively similar results (see Appendix Table A2). 
[Table 4 here] 
The estimated effect of consolidation on math is positive and marginally significant for the 
preferred 380 student bandwidth. Despite being marginally significant, the point estimate is 
relatively small (0.04 standard deviation units). A similar pattern is exhibited for the ELA results 
- insignificant results for smaller bandwidths and statistically significant, albeit practically small, 
positive effects (0.06 standard deviation units) for the preferred bandwidth of 380 students. Results 
are generally similar when we restrict the E bandwidth to ±120; however, we observe statistically 
significant negative results in math for some models in the smallest bandwidth of E≤ ±60. We 
 
8 The estimated coefficients have been omitted from our reported results for the sake of space and are available upon 
request. Estimated coefficients for demographic variables and forcing variables are available in Appendix Tables 
A1a and A1b. 




recommend caution in interpreting the latter results given the number of statistically significant 
differences in student characteristics presented in Table 3 for the smallest bandwidth. 
It is possible that the impacts of consolidation vary over time especially if students require 
several years to adjust to their new surroundings. In Table 5, we examine how time impacts the 
estimated consolidation coefficient using a series of dummy variables that allow us to examine the 
non-linear impacts of time. As the results in Table 5 show, the consolidation impacts do not vary 
much over time. The results for math are mostly insignificant, except in the second year after 
consolidation in the largest bandwidth specification. For ELA, however, the coefficient is 
consistently positive and significant in the largest bandwidth and preferred model, which includes 
the quadratic form of the forcing variable. Here too, however, the coefficients are modest, ranging 
between 0.05 and 0.08 standard deviation units. 
[Table 5 here] 
In general, our preferred models—which include controls for student demographics—
indicate impacts that are either null or small and positive. We find small positive statistically 
significant results, especially for ELA, when using the largest bandwidth and including the 
quadratic form of the forcing variable. 
Economies of Scale 
The primary motivation that policymakers articulated for consolidating smaller school 
districts in Arkansas was to achieve cost savings through economies of scale. Even if consolidation 
only had null-to-small positive effects on achievement, Act 60 would still be considered a success 
if consolidation reduced administrative and other spending outside of the classroom, freeing up 
resources for additional classroom spending or to be redirected toward other important public 
purposes.  




Unfortunately, we cannot leverage the sharp enrollment threshold used in the previous 
analysis because districts subject to Act 60, in many cases, merged with districts above the 
threshold, and it is impossible to disentangle the finances of one from the other after consolidation. 
A difference-in-difference analysis has the potential to help us estimate causal impacts, but we 
need to secure better pre-consolidation finance trend data before that is feasible.  
Instead, to investigate whether districts affected by consolidation experienced positive 
economies of scale we descriptively compare district-level spending trends before and after 
consolidation occurred. Table 6 presents a summary of financial information for districts affected 
by consolidation and Arkansas averages for the 2004 to the 2008 school years. 
[Table 6 here] 
In 2004, prior to consolidation, districts that would be forced to consolidate by Act 60 spent 
more on average, a lesser share on classroom teachers, and a greater share on other certified staff 
like administrators than did other school districts in Arkansas (see Columns 1-3 of Table 6). On 
the surface, this supports the argument that consolidation had the potential to deliver improvements 
through greater economies of scale.  
The appropriate counterfactual, however, is to compare expenditure trends for districts 
affected by consolidation (both consolidated and receiving) to unaffected districts to see if affected 
districts exhibit substantial changes after consolidation that deviate from broader state trends. 
Columns 4-11 of Table 6 shows that Act 60 affected districts exhibit consistent resource allocation 
over time to both classroom staff and other certified staff (see last two rows of Table 6). While 
affected districts experienced increased spending per pupil, that trend did not deviate meaningfully 
from the overall state trend. Based on this simple, descriptive analysis we do not find evidence that 
Act 60 resulted in substantial positive economies of scale for affected districts. 





This paper adds to our understanding of the effects of consolidation on student achievement 
and district finances by taking advantage of a natural experiment in Arkansas which occurred when 
policymakers required the consolidation of all districts with fewer than 350 students for two 
consecutive years. We find that consolidation had either null or small positive effects on the 
achievement of students whose districts were consolidated. In addition, we find no evidence that 
Act 60 resulted in positive economies of scale for affected districts. Overall, Act 60 does not appear 
to have helped Arkansas students much, but on the other hand, it did not harm them either.  
It is important to note that our analysis treats all consolidations as homogenous, rather than 
heterogeneous, events. This is largely because our paper offers an analysis of the effect of a 
statewide mandatory consolidation policy rather than a study of individual district mergers. 
Nevertheless, we note that the evidence presented in this paper largely focuses on the average 
effect of consolidation on different types of students; and that these effects may certainly differ 
across district mergers. 
It is possible that reducing the number of administrative units will pay dividends in the 
future, but it is also possible that larger districts are less responsive to the needs of individual 
communities, harming students down the line. These longer-term effects are as of yet unknown 
and could be a fruitful area for future study. 
Other areas for future work include building out a causal analysis around cost, investigating 
the effect of consolidations on receiving districts, and investigating the impact of school closures 
that result from consolidation.  
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8. Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 


















Distribution of forcing variable (E) district types 
 
Note. Figure presents histograms of forcing variable, E, for three district types: [1] districts that 
were not affected by Act 60 in 2005 (dark gray), [2] districts forced to consolidate (i.e., "Sending 
districts") (light gray), and [3] districts who accepted sending districts in mergers (i.e., 
"Receiving districts") (white). Histogram bar width = 25.




Figure 4:  
District achievement by forcing variable 
  
  
Note. Figure presents distribution of standardized achievement in 2005 (i.e., one year post consolidation) by forcing variable, E.





Districts affected by Act 60 
First Year After 
Consolidation 
Consolidated Due to Enrollment Consolidated and Receiving 
Districts 
2005 59 99 
2006 2 4 
2007 4 14 
2008 -- -- 
2009 -- -- 
2010 1 2 
2011 4 15 
Source: Arkansas Department of Education 
  





School closures in consolidated districts 
First Year Since Consolidation 
Number of Schools Closed 
Elementary Middle Secondary Total 
2005 5 -- 11 16 
2006 8 -- 13 21 
2007 16 4 15 35 
2008 2 -- 4 6 
2009 8 -- 1 9 
2010 5 1 3 9 
2011 4 -- 5 9 
Source: Arkansas Department of Education 





Descriptive statistics for students in consolidated and non-consolidated districts 
















  Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. 
    
  
   
  
Female 0.53 0.51 0.02 0.02 0.51 0.49 0.02* 0.01 
Ethnicity           
   Black 0.02 0.24 -0.22** 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.05 
   Hispanic 0.00 0.02 -0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02** 0.01 
   White 0.98 0.74 0.24*** 0.08 0.80 0.83 -0.03 0.05 
   Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Grade           
   Fourth 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.32 -0.01 0.01 
   Sixth 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.02 0.35 0.33 0.01 0.01 
   Eighth 0.33 0.34 -0.01 0.01 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.01 
Standardized achievement           
   Math 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.06 
   ELA 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.12 0.01 -0.13** 0.05 
Forcing variable: E -34.04 39.74 -73.78*** 5.72 -126.05 186.91 -312.96*** 15.22 
Note. Analysis restricted to students in the 2003-04 school year. s.e. = standard errors that account for clustering of students within districts. Achievement is 
standardized within grade and year across all students in the testing data. *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.10 
 
  





Impacts of district consolidation on student achievement 
  Distance ≤ |60| Distance ≤ |120| Distance ≤ |380| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A. Impacts on standardized math scores               
   Consolidated -0.784*** -0.239*** -0.304 0.024 -0.007 -0.011 -0.032 0.017 0.042* 
 (0.156) (0.090) (0.306) (0.074) (0.039) (0.076) (0.030) (0.016) (0.025) 
   Unique students 4,369 3,597 3,597 9,053 7,452 7,452 26,057 21,288 21,288 
   Unique districts 198 191 191 248 242 242 261 260 260 
Panel B. Impacts on standardized ELA scores             
   Consolidated -0.696*** -0.085 0.035 -0.023 0.015 0.058 -0.030 0.009 0.063*** 
 (0.158) (0.071) (0.245) (0.076) (0.033) (0.065) (0.032) (0.014) (0.023) 
   Unique students 4,369 3,597 3,597 9,053 7,452 7,452 26,057 21,288 21,288 
   Unique districts 198 191 191 248 242 242 261 260 260 
          
Student characteristics  X X  X X  X X 
Linear forcing variable X X  X X  X X  
Quadratic forcing variable     X     X     X 
Note. Unit of analysis is student-year. All models include grade and year fixed effects. Multi-level standard errors account for nesting within student and district. 
*** - P<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.10. Source: Authors' calculations. 





Do results vary over time? 











  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Impacts on standardized math scores         
First year of consolidation -0.2901*** -0.3498 -0.0530 -0.0557 -0.0269 -0.0018 
 (0.0971) (0.3082) (0.0455) (0.0791) (0.0218) (0.0288) 
Second year of consolidation -0.2438*** -0.3034 0.0021 -0.0009 0.0452** 0.0705*** 
 (0.0926) (0.3074) (0.0414) (0.0770) (0.0180) (0.0262) 
Third year of consolidation -0.2433*** -0.3029 -0.0155 -0.0186 -0.0028 0.0225 
 (0.0924) (0.3070) (0.0413) (0.0770) (0.0181) (0.0262) 
Fourth year of consolidation -0.2046** -0.2639 0.0118 0.0087 0.0257 0.0510* 
 (0.0934) (0.3075) (0.0414) (0.0772) (0.0181) (0.0262) 
Panel B. Impacts on standardized ELA scores       
First year of consolidation -0.0398 0.0778 0.0190 0.0627 0.0333* 0.0864*** 
 (0.0777) (0.2459) (0.0400) (0.0686) (0.0202) (0.0266) 
Second year of consolidation -0.0970 0.0210 -0.0044 0.0396 0.0086 0.0618** 
 (0.0730) (0.2449) (0.0359) (0.0664) (0.0166) (0.0241) 
Third year of consolidation -0.1045 0.0132 0.0049 0.0491 0.0093 0.0624*** 
 (0.0730) (0.2445) (0.0359) (0.0665) (0.0167) (0.0241) 
Fourth year of consolidation -0.0638 0.0540 0.0412 0.0855 0.0003 0.0535** 
 (0.0739) (0.2449) (0.0360) (0.0666) (0.0167) (0.0241) 
Unique students 3,597 3,597 7,452 7,452 21,288 21,288 
Unique districts 191 191 242 242 260 260 
Note. Unit of analysis is student-year. All models include lagged student performance, student demographics, and grade and year fixed effects. Multi-level 
standard errors account for nesting within student and district. *** - P<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.10. Source. Authors’ calculations. 
  





Summary of district financial information 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Act 60 
All  
Affected AR Avg 
All  
Affected AR Avg 
All  
Affected AR Avg 
All  
Affected AR Avg 
All  
Affected AR Avg 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Number of Districts 59 99 308 46 254 46 252 46  245  46  245 
Median Area 115 148 147 343 166  343  166  351  171  351  171 
Total Enrollment 13,370 63,712 422,787 62,917 426,136  62,885  432,371  62,252 433,952 62,139  433,333  
Median Enrollment 232 288 678 946 887 911 891 920 943 909 924 
Expenditures/Pupil $7,573 $6,363 $6,475 $7,335 $7,307 $7,575 $7,687 $7,883 $7,992 $8,057 $8,256 
Certified Teachers Share 40.9% 44.5% 45.4% 43.1% 43.4% 42.6% 42.4% 42.6% 42.5% 42.4% 42.1% 
Other Certified (e.g., administration) Share 7.7% 6.3% 5.6% 6.3% 5.8% 6.0% 5.7% 6.2% 6.1% 6.2% 6.1% 
Source. Arkansas Department of Education and authors' calculations 





Figure A1.  
District achievement gains by forcing variable 
  
  
Note. Figure presents distribution of standardized achievement gains in 2005 (relative to 2004) by forcing variable, E.






Impacts of district consolidation on student standardized math scores 
  E ≤ |60| E ≤ |120| E ≤ |380| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Consol. 
-0.784*** -0.239*** -0.304 0.024 -0.007 -0.011 -0.032 0.017 0.042* 
(0.156) (0.090) (0.306) (0.074) (0.039) (0.076) (0.030) (0.016) (0.025) 
Lagged achieve.  
0.729*** 0.728***  0.729*** 0.729***  0.735*** 0.735*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female  
0.032** 0.033**  0.037*** 0.037***  0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Black  
-0.105*** -0.105***  -0.099*** -0.098***  -0.105*** -0.104*** 
 (0.025) (0.026)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Hispanic  
0.091 0.088  0.042 0.043  0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.059) (0.059)  (0.040) (0.040)  (0.019) (0.019) 
Other  
0.040 0.041  -0.011 -0.010  0.016 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.038)  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.014) (0.014) 
FRL  
-0.106*** -0.106***  -0.112*** -0.112***  -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.006) 
ELL  
0.036 0.031  0.025 0.025  -0.037 -0.036 
 (0.154) (0.155)  (0.093) (0.093)  (0.034) (0.034) 
E 
-0.003* -0.002* 0.008 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consol. X E 
-0.014*** -0.002 -0.022 -0.002* -0.001* 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
E^2    
0.000*   0.000   0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Consol. X E^2   
0.000   0.000   0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Unique students 4,369 3,597 3,597 9,053 7,452 7,452 26,057 21,288 21,288 
Unique districts 198 191 191 248 242 242 261 260 260 
Note. Unit of analysis is student-year. All models include grade and year fixed effects. Multi-level standard errors account for nesting 
within student and district. *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.10 
Source. Authors' calculations 
  






Impacts of district consolidation on student standardized ELA scores 
  E ≤ |60| E ≤ |120| E ≤ |380| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Consol. 
-0.696*** -0.085 0.035 -0.023 0.015 0.058 -0.030 0.009 0.063*** 
(0.158) (0.071) (0.245) (0.076) (0.033) (0.065) (0.032) (0.014) (0.023) 
Lagged achieve.  
0.775*** 0.776***  0.773*** 0.773***  0.782*** 0.782*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female  
0.106*** 0.106***  0.094*** 0.094***  0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Black  
-0.102*** -0.103***  -0.111*** -0.112***  -0.099*** -0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Hispanic  
0.109** 0.108**  0.051 0.051  0.042** 0.042** 
 (0.054) (0.054)  (0.038) (0.038)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Other  
-0.010 -0.009  -0.007 -0.009  0.005 0.006 
 (0.034) (0.034)  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.013) (0.013) 
FRL  
-0.097*** -0.097***  -0.093*** -0.093***  -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.006) 
ELL  
-0.159 -0.163  -0.044 -0.045  -0.102*** -0.101*** 
 (0.140) (0.140)  (0.087) (0.087)  (0.032) (0.032) 
E 
0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002** 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Consol. X E 
-0.018*** -0.004** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.002 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
E^2    
0.000   0.000   0.000** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Consol. X E^2   
0.000   0.000   0.000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Unique students 4,369 3,597 3,597 9,053 7,452 7,452 26,057 21,288 21,288 
Unique districts 198 191 191 248 242 242 261 260 260 
Note. Unit of analysis is student-year. All models include grade and year fixed effects. Multi-level standard errors account for nesting 
within student and district. *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.10 
Source. Authors' calculations






Robustness check: What happens when we exclude students in receiving districts? 














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Math results       
Linear model -0.2392*** -0.1283* -0.0071 -0.0185 0.0167 0.0109 
 (0.0900) (0.0748) (0.0388) (0.0336) (0.0156) (0.0147) 
Quadratic model -0.3044 -0.4359* -0.0114 0.0042 0.0418* 0.0201 
 (0.3062) (0.2489) (0.0756) (0.0655) (0.0245) (0.0229) 
Unique students 3,597 3,219 7,452 7,211 21,288 18,755 
Unique districts 191 198 242 247 260 261 
Panel B: ELA results       
Linear model -0.0846 -0.0667 0.0145 0.0139 0.0094 0.0141 
 (0.0705) (0.0641) (0.0333) (0.0296) (0.0143) (0.0134) 
Quadratic model 0.0349 -0.181 0.0575 0.0278 0.0627*** 0.0452** 
 (0.2445) (0.2143) (0.0651) (0.0576) (0.0225) (0.0209) 
Unique students 3,597 3,219 7,452 7,211 21,288 18,755 
Unique districts 191 198 242 247 260 261 
Note. Unit of analysis is student-year. Linear model controls for forcing variable with a linear specification. Quadratic model controls for forcing variable with a quadratic 
specification. All models include grade and year fixed effects. Multi-level standard errors account for nesting within student and district. Source. Authors' calculations. 
 
